Tape bids the pre-revenue names; capex still -34% and 95 days to the Beijing cliff

1. 1. Re-checked at source again today across CIRS, MOFCOM's own announcement as reported by Global Times, HSF Kramer and Mondaq, with no successor arrangement locatable: the suspension of MOFCOM/GAC Announcements 55, 56, 57, 58, 61 and 62 — lithium-ion cells and packs, cathode material, artificial graphite anode material and the related production equipment and technology — runs only to 10 November 2026, which is 95 days from today. Relief is being delivered through general licences for rare earths, gallium, germanium, antimony and graphite to US end users and their global suppliers, not through repeal
2. 2. Three other clocks land in the same fortnight: USTR's exclusions on 178 Chinese products lapse 10 November, the BIS Affiliates Rule suspension ends 9 November so the 50%-ownership provisions return to the EAR on 10 November absent further rulemaking, and the separate Announcement 72 suspension of the US-specific graphite measure runs to 27 November
3. 3. The legal architecture widened while enforcement sat suspended: the 1 January 2026 licensing catalogue added rare-earth compounds including samarium, gadolinium and lutetium plus silver, State Council Order No. 834 of 31 March created China's first dedicated industrial and supply-chain security framework, and MOFCOM Announcement No. 26 of 2026 opened a public reporting mechanism for strategic-mineral export-control violations alongside detentions and actions against Chinese exporters
4. 4. Anode graphite, cathode material and cell-line equipment revert to case-by-case Chinese licensing for anyone who has not landed and commissioned, and using the window is dearer than the Q2 plan assumed: Chinese-origin goods picked up an additional 12.5% Section 301 forced-labour duty on 24 July, a 2% Chinese consumption tax lands on 1 September, and tonnes invoiced from January 2027 also lose the 6% export VAT rebate

What it means: This is still the largest dated risk on the board and it is a cluster, not one item. Anything you need from a Chinese equipment vendor should be shipped, cleared, installed and commissioned before early November rather than merely ordered, and the pull-forward now carries an extra 12.5% duty, so re-run the carrying-cost case before you add orders. Ask Chinese suppliers in writing what their licence path looks like after 10 November and whether they are shipping under a general licence, and have compliance re-screen every Chinese counterparty's ownership tree for the Affiliates Rule snapback on the same date.

1. 1. Re-checked at USTR's own investigation page today and still unresolved: the Section 301 investigations into structural excess manufacturing capacity, initiated 11 March 2026 against sixteen economies including China, the EU, Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Vietnam, Singapore, Switzerland, Norway, Indonesia, Malaysia, Cambodia, Thailand, Bangladesh, Mexico and India, show only the initiation, a comment docket that closed 15 April and hearing dockets. No findings, no proposed action, and the unofficial 24 July completion target has passed
2. 2. Outcomes will be differentiated rather than uniform: the European Commission says it shares the US concern about structural overcapacity but does not consider itself a contributor, and has promised to respond firmly and proportionately to any breach of the August 2025 US-EU framework
3. 3. Model the shape from the precedent, not from a rate: USTR's forced-labour action put 10% on fourteen economies and 12.5% on the remaining 46, additive to MFN and to existing China rates with HTS-specific exemption annexes
4. 4. Correction to how this board has read the Canadian precedent: the 19 August Section 338 duties contain no USMCA exemption — preferential origin does not shield the goods — but they are not unlimited either. The published carve-outs cover energy products, potash, fish, critical minerals, and goods already subject to Section 232 measures including steel, aluminium, copper, semiconductors and most vehicles and parts. No carve-out of any kind has been published for the excess-capacity action, and the statutory backstop is 11 March 2027

What it means: Pull the docket scope against your own HTS lines this month and get tariff-change and cost-allocation language into every non-China Asian and Mexican supply agreement still in negotiation, keyed to entry date rather than ship date. Ask your broker to model your top ten lines under the forced-labour action's two-tier 10/12.5% additive structure as a shape of risk rather than a forecast. For the Canadian leg, check the 338 annexes line by line before you reroute: a critical-mineral or Section 232 article is out of scope, a machine tool or an enclosure is not, and USMCA origin does not help either way.

1. 1. Re-rated from easing to steady on today's read. The agreement is still a draft: Iran's foreign ministry spokesman said on 5 August that the Hormuz arrangement with Oman is in the final stage of drafting and that a joint statement will be issued 'if certain parties do not obstruct this process', and CBS, Al Jazeera and NBC all still describe the US, Iran and Oman as close rather than done. Against that, Lloyd's List Intelligence records at least two ships hit in the strait in the past week plus near misses and warnings from entities claiming to represent the Revolutionary Guard
2. 2. The charge, not the reopening, is the live fight. Trump proposed a 20% toll on cargo transiting the strait on 13 July; the IMO publicly opposed transit fees; eight shipping associations including BIMCO, the International Chamber of Shipping, the Asian Shipowners Association and European Shipowners wrote against compulsory fees; and Al Jazeera's 6 August explainer sets out the legal frame — tolls cannot lawfully be levied for passage through an international strait, but a coastal state may charge for services such as pilotage, navigational assistance and environmental protection
3. 3. Flow is recovering from a very low base: 84 transits in 27 July-2 August against 45 the week before, after non-Iranian transits collapsed to 25 from 108 in mid-July and total traffic ran about 90% below a year earlier. War-risk cover at 3-10% of hull value against 0.25% pre-war is carried from the prior cycle and was not re-read today
4. 4. The price series disagree with each other by more than the move. Trading Economics has Brent at 82.15 on 7 August, down 0.41% on the day, up 5.30% on the month and 23.37% on the year; Fortune quoted Brent at $86.04 at 5:20 a.m. ET the same morning; Forbes had $79.75 on 5 August. The October-to-March futures strip carried on this board is from the prior read and was not re-verified today
5. 5. US and European conversion absorbs the whole move because most tolling and offtake agreements carry no energy pass-through, and a permissioned corridor adds documentation on top: named vessel before loading, screening against OFAC and EU designations, and AIS continuity for the laden leg, because the EU battery passport due 18 February 2027, UFLPA admissibility after the 43 entities added on 3 August and your own FEOC certifications all rest on a custody record a dark leg cannot supply retroactively

What it means: Name one dated series in your energy and freight budget and hold it for the year; the divergence between public Brent quotes this week is larger than most cost-recovery clauses. Do not release war-risk or deviation cover on the announcement — the text is unsigned, ships were hit this week, and premiums lag observable safety by a quarter. Put a who-pays-the-fee clause, named-vessel disclosure and an AIS-continuity representation into freight and forwarder contracts this month, while the services-fee regime is still being drafted.